Corruption: The true enemy of the central eastern European states by Hollestelle, Marieke van
  
Corruption: the True Enemy of the Central Eastern European 
States 
To what extent does EU accession influence anti-corruption policies and therefore income 
inequality in the most recent Member States Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia? 
 
Bachelor thesis 
 
Marieke Johanna Hollestelle 
S1239929 
Leiden University 
Faculty Social Science 
School of Political Science: International Relations and Organisations 
 
 
Bachelor project Inequality in Political Perspective 
DR B.K.S. van Coppenolle  
 
17 May 2016 
8037 words  
 
2 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the effect of European Union (EU) accession on anti-corruption policy 
and income inequality in the most recent Member States: Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. The 
main hypothesis is that EU accession only has a short period of influence, namely before 
actual membership. After membership, a lack of willingness to continue this pattern will 
occur. This pattern is expected to be observed in the analysis of the Regular Reports of the 
European Commission (EC) before accession and the Reports on the Co-operation and 
Verification Mechanism of the EC. The analysis is supported with a thorough description of 
the issues of corruption and income inequality. This is followed by an outline on the situation 
of the eastern European candidates and the active role of the EU in fighting corruption. Then a 
comparison is made between the process and progress of the countries based on data of 
Transparency International and the World Bank. The comparison shows a difference in the 
performances of the countries, which can be a partial conformation of the hypothesis.  
Keywords: corruption, income inequality, Central Eastern European states, European Union, anti-
corruption policy 
I. Introduction 
Corruption is a much-discussed topic and has been around for a very long time. Nevertheless, it is not 
until the end of the nineteen hundreds that corruption became a so called “hot topic” that draws 
attention from governments, international organisations and businesses, and different scholars 
(Johnston, 2005, p. 10). However, fighting corruption has become more important after the anti-
corruption movement was launched in 1990, which contained campaigns from organisations as 
Transparency International, the World Bank, the Open Society Institute, the United Nations, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (Bratsis, 2014, p. 105). This because of the rising interest in the relation 
between corruption and economic inequality as an answer to the rise of global inequalities and the 
change in the meaning of corruption in capitalist states (Bratsis, 2014, p. 108). Corruption is a 
troublesome issue that influences a lot of different developments and aspects within society. It is no 
surprise that it has been an important topic within the European Union (EU). It has been recognised as 
one of the true enemies of potential Member States in the accession process (Szarek-Mason, 2010, 
p.184-185). Moreover, to become a member of the European Union, countries need to address the 
Acquis Communautaire and have to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. These criteria are focused on 
democratic and liberal values. Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia were the last to join the Union in 2007 
and 2013. Some Member States were uncertain about the countries capacities to absorb European 
conditions and the ability to meet the criteria. This was partially due to the high level of corruption and 
severe economic disadvantages in the countries. However, after seven years of preparation and 
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negotiations, the countries were considered ready by the European Commission (EC) to join the EU. 
In the accession period, the EU created multiple institutions and mechanisms to tackle corruption. As 
suggested in the existing literature, the level of corruption influences the level of income inequality in 
a country (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002; Szarek-Mason, 2010; Arnone & Borlini, 2014; 
Johnston, 2005). Therefore, fighting corruption could improve economic performance and income 
inequality, when the implementations of anti-corruption policies are successful. The aim of this study 
is to find an answer to the question: to what extent does EU accession influence anti-corruption 
policies and therefore income inequality in the most recent Member States Bulgaria, Romania and 
Croatia? This by giving an explanation for the situation of the three Member States in relation with 
the EU and by clarifying the issue of corruption, income inequality and the urge of improvement. 
Therefore, the concept of corruption and income inequality will be discussed first, then an analysis on 
the types of corruption in the three Member States will be given, followed by the impact of the EU on 
the anti-corruption policies. The last sections will be an analysis on the development of possible 
positive outcomes of anti-corruption policies and the development of income inequality in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia.  
The first hypothesis of this study is that the link - described in the literature - between the level 
of corruption and the level of income inequality is similar within Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. It is 
expected that the level of corruption will show a similar development as the income inequality. This 
means when the perception of corruption in the countries lowers, the income inequality improves. The 
main hypothesis of this study is that EU accession has a positive influence on the implementation of 
anti-corruption policy and therefore a positive influence on both the level of corruption and the level 
of income inequality within the accession period. However, after membership is established the 
incentives for maintaining the anti-corruption policy will slowly vanish and thus the progress of the 
distribution of income will lag behind.  
II. Accountability and Methodology  
Corruption has been studied for over centuries. Thus the aim of this study is not to find a revolutionary 
explanation for the existence of corruption, but to give an analysis on the effects of corruption on 
income inequality and on what is done to fight the negative consequences of corruption. In many 
studies, corruption is explained as an inequality of domination within society, rather than an system of 
prosperity inequality among different groups in society (Dutta & Mishra, 2013, p. 603). This study 
provides a different view on how corruption is being dealt with in times of the accession of new 
Member States and if these measures positively influence both the level of corruption in the country 
and the level of income inequality.     
As mentioned in the introduction the focus of this study lies on the three most recent Member States. 
The reason behind this selection is simply because these countries have been known for a high level of 
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corruption before accession and are still considered to be problematic. Another reason is the fact that 
the EU changed its tolerance towards corruption right before accession negotiations started. Before, 
the Member States were not to be judged on the level of corruption during negotiations (Szarek-
Mason, 2010, p. 184). This changed when more research became available on the negative influences 
of corruption on the economic performance of countries and when became clear that these countries 
were hold back by corruption to fulfil the accession criteria (Mateescu & Baboi-Stroe, 2002, p. 465). 
Next, because these states have become members of the EU in the last ten years, it is to be expected 
that much detailed data is available from the period before and after accession. Together with the 
active role of the EU in fighting corruption in these countries, it is to be expected that many reports on 
the progress of these countries are written and available.  
The main argument is based on the reports of the European Commission and findings of 
Transparency International and the World Bank. These organisations are focused on the progress of 
countries either on economic performance (World Bank) or performance linked to corruption 
(Transparency International and the European Commission). The World Bank is known for its 
enormous databank, which contains data on the development of countries around the globe and is a 
reliable source for data on the distribution of income (World Bank, 2016). Transparency International 
is an organisation that wants to emphasise the problem of corruption throughout the world. By 
providing data and background information on the status of certain regions and countries, 
Transparency International tries to emphasise the severe conditions countries are in and through the 
concept of “naming and shaming tries to create awareness among citizens and officials (Transparency 
International, 2016). Data of these organisations will be analysed to be able to come to conclusions on 
the progress of these countries on both issues. The reports of the EC are used to get a more detailed 
perspective on the types of corruption that the countries have to deal with, the concrete actions that 
have been followed through and the progress made with the anti-corruption policies. The analyses by 
the EC are used, because in order to find an answer to the effect of the role of the EU, the focus should 
be on the measures and opinions provided by the European Union.  
III. Corruption and Income Inequality 
“Corruption benefits the few at the expense of the many” (Johnston, 2005, p. 1). 
Before consulting the literature on the relation between corruption and income inequality, a definition 
of corruption must be established. To come to a single definition of corruption it is interesting to see 
what definitions are used by international organisations, such as the EU, Transparency International 
and the World Bank, who claim to deal with the phenomenon of corruption. For this study in 
particular it is interesting to see: what definitions are used by the EU, because the analysis is focused 
on its Member States, Transparency International because it is the main organisation that measures 
5 
 
corruption and the World Bank because it provides data on the economic status of the concerning 
Member States. 
Altogether, the EU was one of the first to create a definition to work with and to establish the 
playing field in which the concept corruption exists. The European Parliament (EP) came with its first 
definition of corruption in 1995 before finishing the association agreements with Bulgaria, Romania, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic and claimed that corruption is “the behaviour of persons with public 
or private responsibilities who fail to fulfil their duties because of financial or other advantage has 
been granted or directly or indirectly offered to them in return for actions or omissions in the course 
of their duties”(European Parliament cited in Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 6). However, in 2003 the EP 
together with the EC and the United Nations (UN) accepted a much broader concept of corruption, 
namely that corruption is ‘abuse of power for private gain’ (EC cited in Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 7). 
Other international organisations followed with comparable definitions. The in 1995 founded 
Transparency International, which was part of the anti-corruption movement in the 90s, came with 
corruption as  “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, Corruption 
Glossary, 2016). The World Bank is one of the international organisations that keeps the focus of 
corruption on the public sector, because of its main task consists supporting governments. It has 
described corruption as one of the greatest obstructions to economic and social development, because 
of its negative influence on the rule of law and institutions on which economic development depends 
(Tabish & Jha, 2012, p. 22).  
The most obvious difference between the definitions provided by the organisations is the 
difference in the role of the private and public sector. Where the EU and Transparency International do 
not make a distinguish between the two, does the World Bank only focus on the corruptive actions 
made by the public sector. However, because of the trend of liberalisation and privatisation of the 
economy in Western States, the boundaries between state and society (public and private) become 
more vague. This because of the redefinition of “public” and “private”, where public relations become 
private enterprises (Johnston, 2005, p. 11). This makes the definition by the World Bank less 
comprehensive and the definitions provided by the EU and Transparency International more 
functional. Where all three organisation seem to agree on is the fact it is an abuse of power of the few 
which is provided by the many.  
Besides the differences in conceptualisation, research must be done in the different 
appearances of corruption. By detecting the different appearances of corruption in the Member States, 
a statement can be made about the progress in the fight against corruption throughout the years. In the 
literature the most used divisions in types of corruption is between high-level and low-level 
corruption, political and bureaucratic corruption, grand and petty corruption. These divisions all 
indicate the same separations. High-level corruption is often called grand or political corruption and 
refers to the highest level of the public sphere where policies and rules are formulated. Most of the 
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time there is being referred to the highest levels of the political system where political corruption is 
defined as the “manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of 
resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain power, status 
and wealth” (Transparency International, Corruption Glossary, 2016). Low-level corruption is often 
synonymously used with petty and administrative corruption which is corruptive behaviour by public 
officials in the interaction with ordinary citizens in the daily life. This is in regard to the 
implementation of regulation and law (Budak, 2007; Transparency International, Corruption Glossary, 
2016). A third type and well-known type of corruption is ‘State Capture’. This means the influences 
(capturing) of firms on legislation, rules, laws, and regulation through payments by private actors to 
public officials (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000, p. 4). All these types of corruption can occur in 
different areas with different actors where power is generated. In a later section of this study, the 
different types of corruption will be described more thoroughly, after analysing the different types of 
corruption existing in the concerning Member States.  
Link between corruption and inequality 
The essence of the problem of corruption on inequality is well put by Johnston. He states that 
“because of corruption, for millions “democracy” means increased insecurity and “free markets” are 
where the rich seem to get richer at the expense of everyone else” (Johnston, 2005, p. 1). Therefore, 
the next step is to determine the essence of income inequality and how income inequality can be 
measured and indicated. To indicate income inequality, the Gini-index will be used in this research. 
This because it measures the extent to which the distribution of income within an economy is perfect 
equal among citizens or households. In the empirical research of Gupta et al (1998) the impact of 
corruption on the Gini coefficient is tested through a cross-country regression analysis with a large 
sample of countries. The results show that the relation between a higher level of corruption and higher 
income inequality is significant (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002, p. 30). This means that an 
increase in the level of corruption reduces the income growth of the poor. Therefore, the Gini-index is 
a relevant measurement to indicate the development of the level of income inequality in the Member 
States. After establishing this, an analysis can be made on the relevance of the theory that corruption 
negatively influences the level of income inequality in the Member States.  
Although, because of the before mentioned multifaceted character, it is difficult to measure the 
direct consequences of corruption. However, many studies show an intertwined relation between 
corruption and economic inequality. Findings in the literature also acknowledge that corruption 
disrupts a fair distribution of income, lowers investments and economic growth, helps tax evasion and 
lowers the quality of governance and other services provided for the public and rattles efficient 
allocation of resources (for example: health care, education, infrastructure) (Mauro, 1998, p. 12; 
Budak, 2007, p. 40). Bribes as one of the types of corruption, is a widespread phenomenon that raise 
transaction costs, lead to uncertainty and distrust in the economy, which will lead to inefficient 
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economic outcomes (Gray & Kaufmann in Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 19). Furthermore, it will negatively 
influence trade and services provided by small enterprises, because they either cannot afford to pay 
their bribes or they are not capable of competing in a market with uneven rules (Gray & Kaufmann, 
1998, p. 1; Dutta & Mishra, 2013, p. 603). This supports the argument that corruption is only 
beneficiary for a specific and limited group. This limited group is the only group using the secret 
instruments that are based on favouritism and bribes for private gain that is at the expense of those 
who do not participate because they are not wealthy enough to gain power through paying bribes 
(Arnone & Borlini, 2014, p. 2; Budak, 2007, p. 40).  This subsequently feeds economic inequality 
within an economy. These groups are often well-connected individuals within society and are often 
citizens that belong to the high-income groups (Tanzi, 1995 in Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 
2002, p. 23). This is also applicable for investments, where corruption creates higher incentives for 
capital investments instead of investments in labour intensive business, because it is more expensive 
and less innovative. This leads to a deprivation of income for the lower-income groups of society and 
they can forget about the same opportunities because they are being ignored (Gupta, Davoodi, & 
Alonso-Terme, 2002, p. 24).   
IV. Corruption in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
All states have different forms of political organisation, have had different paths of transition and have 
different systems for the distribution of access and accountability (Hellmann, 2011).  The Central and 
Eastern European states have something in common, namely the transition from communism to 
capitalism after the breakdown of the Soviet Union (SU). Another resemblance is a history of 
clientelism and bribes and the existence of economic inequality within the states. The breakdown of 
the SU created opportunities for corruption to develop in the former communist states (Vachudova, 
2009, p. 44). The states found themselves in a weakened position, because of the complete renewal 
and transition to a democratic states. This came along with redefining institutions and establishing a 
new position for the government, which made it possible for the former communist elites and public 
officials to step into this window of opportunities and give into corruptive behaviour for private gain 
(Caiden, Dwivedi, & Jabbra, 2001, p. 82; Johnson, 2004, p. 6).  
The EU decided to help the CEE countries and guide them in the transition to a state with 
democratic values and a free market system (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 1).  The three countries had a 
long transition and it was not until 1997 that the EC declared the countries satisfy the requirement of 
democracy, constitutional state and the protection of minorities, which led to the start of the accession 
negotiations in February 2000 and membership for Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (Lagendijk & 
Wiersma, 2001, p. 31). However, one of the main problems within these three countries and accession 
to the European Union has been and still is the level of corruption. Table 1 shows the results of the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the countries throughout the last years. It shows that the 
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countries are known for a relative high level of corruption in the EU. After more research became 
available on the negative effects of corruption on economic- and democratic development, the EU 
started to acknowledge that it is also a fatal obstacle and major concern for both Member States as 
Candidate States which needs to be prevented and addressed (Sajó, 2002, p. 11). To be able to analyse 
the existence of and the progress on the level of corruption in the countries, information on specific 
types of corruption within the countries need to be explored. This is important not only to be able to 
identify the measures taken within the anti-corruption policy, but also to discover progress. Table 2 
shows a summary of the types of corruption that were discovered in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. 
This summary is based on data provided by the Open Society Institute and the Regular Reports of the 
European Commission. The choice for using the results of these institutions is because of their 
intensive role in fighting corruption in the Member States before, during and after the accession 
period. The Open Society Institute was a program initially initiated to independently support the EU 
accession process. This was done by representative experts of the states that were being monitored in 
the accession period. The main task of these experts was to report the critical areas in which corruption 
was considered most problematic (The Open Society Institute , 2002, p. 9). They use a broad range of 
surveys on legislation and institutions that might serve the fight against corruption. The first draft of 
the reports were analysed by members of an advisory board an national gatherings (The Open Society 
Institute , 2002, p. 9). The Regular Reports, written by the European Commission, give an annual 
status on the progress on anti-corruption policy before membership. This by evaluating on the extent 
to which commitments are implemented and effective (European Commission, 1998-2006). After 
analysing the information provided by the Open Society Institute and the European Commission, the 
types of corruption, the relating fields and characteristics are put together with the findings in the 
literature in table 2.  
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Table 1. International Ranking 2015 and Corruption Perception Index 2012-2015  
 
2012 CPI 
score 
2013 CPI 
score 
2014 CPI 
score 
2015 CPI 
score 
International 
Ranking   
2015 
Bulgaria 41 41 43 41 69 
Romania 44 43 43 46 58 
Croatia 46 48 48 51 50 
EU & 
Western 
Europe 
68 68 65 67  
 
Note: A high CPI score implies a lower level of corruption on a scale from 0 to 100. The International 
Ranking contains a number of 168 ranked countries based on their CPI score, where closer to 0 
means less corrupt. The Corruption Perception Index is based on the opinion of five different sources: 
Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings, Freedom House Nations in Transit, Global Insight 
Country Risk Ratings, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence and the 
Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (Saisana & Saltelli, 2012, p. 9).  
Source: Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/infographic 
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Table 2. Types of Corruption within Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
Type Actors Action 
High-level 
political 
corruption 
 Bureaucratic elites 
 Politicians  
   
 
 Lack of good governance, transparency and accountability 
 Large-scale embezzlement and misconduct through public 
procurement and disposal of public property  
 Economic privileges and special interest 
 Large political donations and bribes  
 Lack of transparency in party finance and election winning 
 
Low-level 
administrative 
corruption 
 Public officials 
 Politicians  
 Petty officials 
 Bribes of public officials to bend the rules for private- or 
group gain 
 Bribes offered by politicians to “get things done” 
 Bribes offered by public officials to ordinary citizens, who 
want access to basic goods or services in places like 
hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies. 
 Misuse of funds  
 
State Capture  Networks  
 Judiciary  
 Businessmen  
 Financial intelligence 
 Media  
  
 Takeover of public institutions for private business of 
criminal activity  
 Undermining free elections through black funds, hidden 
advertising  
 Misuse of legislative power 
 Lack of legal framework  
 Lack of autonomy and transparency in the judicial system  
 Undermining the legal system 
 Corruptive behaviour blocks investments  
 Corruption of and in the media  
Institutionalised   Politicians  
 Police  
 Public and private 
sector 
 Judiciary  
 Health sector 
 Citizens  
 Lack of ethic codes and codes to conduct in the public and 
private sectors  
 Favouritism and discrimination exercised in favour of ruling 
parties in exchange for political contributions 
 Lack of awareness among civil society  
Note: this table shows the different types of corruption that seems to have appeared in the Member 
States. This information is based on the evaluations of the Reports of the EC on the progress of the 
Member States and on findings in the literature on the typology of corruption. Both reports and 
literature show similar methodology in describing types of corruption. 
Source: (European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria's progress towards accession, 1998-2006; 
European Commission, Regular Report on Romania's progress towards accession, 1998-2006; 
European Commission, Croatia Progress Report, 2006-2012; Caiden, Dwivedi, & Jabbra, 2001, p. 22)   
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V. Impact of the EU on the Anti-Corruption Policies 
To understand to what extent EU accession could have influenced the anti-corruption policies of the 
Candidate States, the interference of the EU must be established. Therefore, in this section the most 
important tactics and instruments of the EU will be discussed. This by first describing the development 
of EU interference in anti-corruption policy in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia and second by putting 
apart multiple monitoring mechanisms. 
In 2000 the countries Bulgaria and Romania were considered ready to officially join the 
European Union. Although the Copenhagen political criteria were satisfied, the opinion about 
corruption was still negative. Corruption was in both countries still seen as a “widespread and 
systemic problem” that undermined trust in the abilities of the countries to fit EU standards (EC cited 
in Mateescu & Baboi-Stroe, 2002, p. 465). However, these standards came under attack, as it did not 
seem fair to judge these countries based on corruption, because old Member States were never held 
back because of corruption (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 184).  Still, with the prospect of EU accession, 
the CEE countries had to come up with strategies to tackle corruption. Without having a legislative 
standard or an institutional template at first, the EU had to create an acquis which would function as an 
anti-corruption standard for Candidate States (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 184). These standards were 
divided into three stages. First, the standards of anti-corruption were to be made. Second, these 
established standards are to be evaluated by the EC and third, to fulfil these standards, some sort of 
financial and technical assistance needs to be available for the candidates (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 
185). The EU also set up guidelines for anti-corruption policy for the candidate countries. These 
guidelines were listed in the communication of the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee (Appendix 1) (European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee - On a comprehensive EU policy against corruption, 2003).  The EC 
continued the above mentioned evaluations and recommendations through annual reports on the 
progression of Bulgaria, Romania and till the moment of accession (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 224). 
These reports show both the willingness of the Member States to fight corruption and the ability to 
implement “good” anti-corruption policy. Furthermore, they are important for the analyses on the link 
between anti-corruption policy and the economic development in the three countries that will be 
discussed later.  
Furthermore, the EU decided to develop a post-accession monitoring system with so-called 
benchmarks (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 226) (Appendix 2). These benchmarks emphasise the areas in 
which corruption must be combatted and what needs to be improved or created to be able to fight 
corruption. To monitor these benchmarks the countries Bulgaria and Romania are kept being under 
supervision by the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). Every year the Commission 
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files a report on the progression of the countries under the CVM. This reflects the progression made on 
fighting the different levels of corruption. The mechanism is also way to pressure the new Member 
States to continue with domestic reforms that fit EU standards. This by the effect of “naming and 
shaming”, as this forces the countries to take action. The possibility of negative publicity can simply 
destroy the position in the international community (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 262 & 234). However, 
this tactic is only used for Bulgaria and Romania. Croatia is not kept under any mechanism to make 
sure certain ideals are fulfilled. The exact reason for a lack of supervision after accession remains 
unclear.  
Besides standards, guidelines and evaluations through reports, the EU also focused on help 
through other organisations. All three countries have also been motivated to work with organisations 
like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Working Group on 
bribery in international commercial transactions and the Group of States Against Corruption 
(GRECO). Further research will not be done into the work of these organisations, because the effects 
of the co-operation with these organisations is discussed in the Regular and Progress Reports of the 
EC on the countries. Furthermore, these developments are seen as a constant pressure on the fight on 
corruption rather than a possible change of direction in the anti-corruption policies.  
To sum these measures up, the EC tries to keep the countries focused on fighting corruption. 
The aim of the annual reports of the Commission is to reflect on progress made by the countries and 
then, when needed, force the countries to take counter-measures. However, the question rises if these 
reports have a significant influence on the implementation of anti-corruption policies and therefore a 
positive outcome on the level of corruption in the country.  
Next, the link between anti-corruption policy and economic inequality will be investigated by 
looking more deeply into the Regular Reports of the Commission. When the progress on the combat 
against corruption is made clear, the progress on the economic performance on inequality will be 
explored. All this to eventually find a possible link between the level of corruption and income 
inequality as described by the literature.  
 
VI. Analysis of the Fight against Corruption and the Development in the 
Distribution of Income in Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
To be able to find a link between the progress of fighting corruption and the development in income 
inequality in the countries, data must be collected. As mentioned in the previous section, the EC filed 
out annual reports on the status of corruption and the effect of the anti-corruption policy in the 
countries. Table 3 shows the annual evaluation of the Commission before the official accession. The 
table only gives a brief line on the status of the countries. However, this shows the ever importance of 
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fighting corruption before the actual accession and thus shows a clear general perspective of the 
development before accession.  
Table 3. Evaluation of corruption in the Regular Report of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia 
 Bulgaria Romania 
1998 Corruption remains a serious problem as mentioned 
in the Opinion 
The fight against corruption needs to be further 
strengthened 
1999 Corruption remains a very serious problem in 
Bulgaria. Petty corruption is reportedly 
widespread in daily life. 
Corruption is still a widespread problem in 
Romania. 
2000 
Corruption continues to be a very serious problem Corruption continues to be a widespread and 
systemic problem 
2001 Corruption continues to be considered as one of the 
main problems facing Bulgarian society 
there has been no noticeable reduction in levels of 
corruption and measures taken to tackle corruption 
have been limited 
2002 Corruption has continued to give serious cause for 
concern. 
Corruption remains a serious problem that is largely 
unresolved 
2003 Public opinion still perceives corruption as a 
serious problem. The fight against corruption 
remained high on the 
political agenda of the Government. 
International reports and surveys indicate that 
corruption in Romania continues to be 
widespread and affects all aspects of society. 
2004 
Surveys and assessments conducted by both 
national and international organisations 
confirm that corruption continues to be perceived as 
a serious problem, although there 
are no reports of deterioration 
Surveys and assessments conducted by both 
national and international organisations 
confirm that corruption remains a serious and 
widespread problem in Romania which 
affects almost all aspects of society. There has been 
no reduction in perceived levels of 
corruption and the number of successful 
prosecutions remains low, particularly for highlevel 
corruption 
2005 
Surveys and assessments conducted by both 
national and international organisations confirm 
that widespread corruption remains a cause for 
concern and affects many aspects of society. 
There is a positive downward trend as far as 
administrative corruption is concerned, but the 
overall enforcement record in the field of 
corruption remains very weak 
Surveys and assessments conducted by both 
national and international organisations confirm 
that corruption remains a serious and widespread 
problem that affects many aspects of 
society. The impact to date of Romania’s fight 
against corruption has been limited, there has 
been no significant reduction in perceived levels of 
corruption and the number of successful 
prosecutions remains low, particularly for high-
level political corruption. 
2006 
Overall, certain progress has been made in fighting 
corruption.  
Bulgaria needs to present clear 
evidence of results in its fight against corruption, in 
particular high-level corruption. 
Overall, progress has been made in fighting 
corruption 
Romania needs to continue efforts with a view to 
consolidating 
and building on the progress made in its fight 
against corruption. 
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 Croatia 
2005 The effectiveness of the fight against corruption needs further strengthening 
2006 
There has been some progress in the fight against corruption, but this issue 
remains a serious problem. 
2007 
Some first results are appearing in the fight against corruption // Some progress 
has been made in the fight against corruption, with further legislative strengthening and first 
results in some important cases. However, corruption remains a widespread problem and 
considerable efforts are still needed. 
2008 
Most tools are in place to fight against corruption but, given the scale of the problem, these are not 
being deployed with sufficient vigour. 
2009 
Anticorruption efforts have produced initial results, but corruption remains widespread and tools are 
not being deployed with sufficient vigour, especially against political corruption. 
2010 
Anti-corruption efforts have been stepped up with some positive results but 
corruption remains prevalent in many areas. 
2011 
Anti-corruption efforts have been accelerated with positive results, in particular as regards improved 
legislation and the strengthening of the relevant 
authorities. 
2012 Croatia improved its track record of strengthened prevention measures in the fight against corruption.  
Note: These statements are based on the opinion of the European Commission. The EC refined 
its opinion through analysing data on the progress of the level of corruption in certain areas, 
the development of institutions and awareness of civil society, which were set out in the EU 
principles for fighting corruption (Appendix 1) and benchmarks (Appendix 2). Source: 
Commission (EC), Regular Reports 1998-2012:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/package/index_en.htm 
 
What can be concluded from the reports on all three of the countries the fight against 
corruption can be divided into a few main strategies. The literature also provides a similar summary on 
the different types of  combating corruption. From both sources it can be concluded that, to tackle the 
types of corruption illustrated in table 2, the following is needed: a) political will to reform, b) creating 
an institutional and legal environment which will tame corruption, c) pressure by the international 
community, d) awareness among civil society, e) targets in certain areas (for example transparency in 
the judiciary), f) implementation of ethical codes for discipline and integrity within society (Caiden, 
Dwivedi, & Jabbra, 2001, pp. 33-35). These strategies are leading in the evaluation of the reports by 
the EC and form a clear indication for detecting progress on fighting corruption. 
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When analysing the Regular Reports on the three countries, a slight improvement can be seen 
in controlling corruption within the accession period (Table 3). The countries make good progress in 
creating a legal framework, increasing investigations in corruptive actions, contributing to action plans 
by the EU or national government and creating political will in fighting types of corruption. Although 
good will by the countries seemed to be present, the actual implementation of anti-corruption policy 
did not go as steadily. The EC noticed similar problems in all three countries with creating 
transparency within the judicial system, the financing of political parties and election campaigns, 
problems with fighting petty and high-level political corruption and creating public awareness and 
trust in public authorities (European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria's, Romania’s and 
Croatia’s progress towards accession, 1998-2013). On the contrary, the last reports before the actual 
accession is quite positive about the progress made by all three countries. All three reports state that 
good progression has been made, but “corruption remains a problem” (European Commission, 
Communication From the Commission: Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU 
membership of Bulgaria and Romania, 2006). An explanation for this behaviour is presented in the 
literature, including by M. Kartal, who analyses longitudinal data within existing literature. He 
suggests that there is a high public support in most of the CEE countries for EU policies, including 
anti-corruption policy before actual membership (Kartal, 2014, p. 942). He states that incentives are 
created with the prospect of membership, for both politicians and citizens to increase the willingness 
to fight corruption (Kartal, 2014, p. 949). After membership has been established, the EU has less 
leverage to pressure the countries for implementing anti-corruption policy (Derderyan, 2015, p. 3). So-
called “backsliding” kicks in and the countries tend to lose the will to reform their corruptive habits. 
This because membership has already been accomplished and therefore does not function as a goal on 
its own and sometimes membership does not meet its expectations (Kartal, 2014, p. 942 & 952). To 
see whether this theory is applicable to Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia the results after accession need 
to be analysed.  
To keep grip on Bulgaria and Romania their policies in fighting corruption and other reforms, 
the EU created the supranational pressure instrument, the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
(CVM). Whilst reading the reports of the CVM, similar statements have been made towards the 
progress of corruption in the three countries. For example, the 2015 report on Bulgaria states that 
“given the political uncertainties the country experienced in the past year – progress has been slow 
and further steps are needed” (European Commission, Report on progress in Bulgaria under the Co-
operation and Verification Mechanism, 2015). It seems to be, that making progress has been a slow 
process for both Bulgaria and Romania. The earlier mentioned benchmarks, which were set up in 
2006, have not been met until slight progress was recognised from 2012. The EC recognises that real 
commitment lacks in both countries after accession (European Commission, Commission issues report 
on progress in Bulgaria and Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, 2014). The 
reports of January 2016 of both countries state that there is a shortcoming in the reforms of the 
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judiciary, a lack of track record on high-level corruption cases and that there is an absence of 
consensus on how to address further implementation of anti-corruption policies (European 
Commission, Commission Reports on progress in Bulgaria and Romania under the Co-operation and 
Verification Mechanism, 2016).  
It is difficult to create a more thorough understanding of the fight against corruption and its 
progression from these reports, because of their general and abstract character. It can be assumed that 
because certain areas are not mentioned as critical in these reports, the fight against corruption has 
been successful. However, the overall message of these reports remain the same, namely that 
corruption remains a widespread problem. A theory - where most of the consulted literature agrees 
upon - is that the EU has failed in pressuring the Member States into improving their implementation 
of anti-corruption policies into a successful decrease in corruptive actions after accession (Derderyan, 
2015; Kartal, 2014; Szarek-Mason, 2010).  
As for Croatia, analysing the progression made on fighting corruption after accession - 
through reports of the EU - is put to a stop. There is no similar way in following the progression made 
by the country as is done by Bulgaria and Romania. However, the statements summarised in table 3, 
suggest that Croatia’s progress went slightly faster compared to the other two. After 2009, a more 
positive tone is put to the general analyses. Croatia shows good effort in the combat against 
corruption. This is in line with the theory of Mr. Kartal, where countries try to satisfy the EU by 
showing positive result. Unfortunately, there has been little data and control of anti-corruption policy 
in Croatia after membership has been established. Therefore, the analysis can hardly continue.  
Although, whilst reading the reports, slow progress has been made in fighting corruption, 
another source needs to be studied. The data provided by the before introduced Transparency 
International will be leading. Graph 1-3 (and Appendix 3) show the results of the CPI of the countries. 
Here a positive reduction in the level of corruption is seen in all the three different countries. Although 
the countries do not come close to the EU CPI average shown in the graph 4, the countries certainly 
show some form of a positive outcome. The question remains if this slight positive outcome is a 
positive outcome for the income inequality of the countries. This will be tested by looking at collected 
data on the income equality.  
The graphs 1-3 (and Appendix 3) also show the available data on income inequality translated 
into the Gini index of the three countries. A number close to zero, means a country’s distribution of 
income per household within the economy is close to perfectly equal (World Bank, 2016). When 
analysing both graphics, one can see that Romania could be an example of the in the literature 
described relationship between the level of corruption and income inequality. As the CPI increases – 
which means a decrease in corruptive behaviour within the country – the Gini index also shows great 
improvement. An explanation for this trend could be the cause of well implemented anti-corruption 
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policy that affects the CPI. Striking is the trend after accession, where after 2007 the CPI rises and the 
Gini index lowers. This is in contrast to the backsliding argument found in the literature. To see if the  
positive trend in the CPI is supported by the EC, the report of the EC of the CVM needs to be 
consulted. The most recent report of 2016 shows that Romania experiences “continued progress 
towards the goals of the CVM and indicates where further steps are needed” (European Commission, 
Commission Reports on progress in Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, 
2016). These needed steps are focused on the reform of the judicial and the political commitment to 
continue the fight against corruption (European Commission, Commission Reports on progress in 
Romania under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, 2016). As mentioned before, slow 
progress is recognised by the EC. However, the progress made, might be indicated through the CPI of 
Romania.  
Bulgaria shows a slight different transition with less positive outcomes. Both the Gini index 
and the CPI are less fluctuating, which could indicate a minimum effort in fighting corruption and the 
influence on the income inequality in Bulgaria. This was also acknowledged by the EC in the report of 
2015. The EC states that, for example, officials need to keep motivate the development towards 
reforms and show leadership in tackling corruption (European Commission, Report on progress in 
Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, 2014). Limited progression is 
recognised by the EC. For example, in 2014 a concrete step forward is mentioned in the judicial area 
(European Commission, Report on progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification 
Mechanism, 2014) and in 2016 this area has improved even more (European Commission, Report on 
progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism, 2016). The slow or almost 
invisible progress is confirmed by the results in the CVM reports. In contrast to Romania, Bulgaria 
shows less progress on both the CPI as the Gini index. The Gini index remains relatively high and the 
CPI does not show great improvements. This could suggest that the link between anti-corruption and 
income inequality is very strong.  
Croatia shows a opposite development then Bulgaria and Romania. Both levels seem to 
increase, which is not in line with theory. The CPI tends to improve over the years, but the Gini index 
increases, which indicates the distribution of income stays or becomes less equal. Unfortunately, 
reports on the progress of anti-corruption policy is only available before accession. No reports are 
found on the progress of anti-corruption policy in Croatia after membership. The reason for absence of 
a mechanism that continues to follow progression made by Croatia remains unknown. This makes a 
full analysis on the performance and therefore the link between corruption and income inequality, 
more difficult to make.  
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Graph 1. Gini index and CPI Bulgaria 1998-2015 
 
 
 Graph 2. Gini index and CPI Romania 1998-2015 
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Graph 3. Gini index and CPI Croatia 1999-2015 
 
Note: A high CPI score implies a lower level of corruption on a scale from 0 to10 (0 = very corrupt, 
10 = very clean). The Corruption Perception Index is based on the opinion of five different sources: 
Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings, Freedom House Nations in Transit, Global Insight 
Country Risk Ratings, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence and the 
Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (Saisana & Saltelli, 2012, p. 9).  
Source: Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/infographic 
The Gini index is based on the estimation of the World Bank. It measures to the extent to 
which the distribution of income after taxation among  households within an economy deviates from 
perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received 
against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest  household. The Gini index 
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as 
a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, 
while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Bulgaria: Data on the countries is provided and 
revised by the National Statistical Office from 1995 onward. Romania: data is based on data from 
EUROSTAT, the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, the National Bank of Romania, and World 
Bank estimations. Croatia: data is partly provided by V. Frajtic (personal contact, 31-05-2016)   
(World Bank, 2016).  
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Graph 4. Corruption Perception Index 1998-2015  EU included
 
Note: The International Ranking contains a number of approximately 165 ranked countries based on 
their CPI score. The Corruption Perception Index is based on the opinion of experts and analysts. A 
high index score implies a lower level of corruption on a scale from 0 to 10. The average of the EU 
and Western Europe is the score of all the countries in the area divided by the number of EU Member 
States and reasonable Western European states, who are not a Member State.  
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VII. Conclusion  
Analysing the literature, reports and data on the development of corruption and income inequality 
within Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, reveal that there is a variation within the performance of 
implementation of anti-corruption policies. Corruption is overall seen as a widespread concern for the 
economic and democratic development. The literature agrees upon the fact that these former 
communist countries are highly affected with corruptive practices, because of its transition process 
from communism to a state with Western values and characteristics. Because of their transition and the 
urge of EU enlargement, the European Union felt the responsibility to fulfil a certain role in guiding 
these eastern former communist countries. Although the EU tried to develop an almost ‘one size fits 
all’ guidance for the CEE countries, it is seen that results differ on the implementation of anti-
corruption policies and therefore the performance of the countries in fighting corruption and income 
inequality. To provide an answer to the question to what extent EU accession influences anti-
corruption policy, the actual progress of the countries on fighting corruption has been measured by 
reflecting on the reports of the Commission. As seen in the reports before accession, the countries 
Bulgaria and Romania were kept under pressure with negative results and slow progress in the combat 
against corruption. It was not until the year before accession, that discreet progress was acknowledged. 
However, the results of the CPI of Romania show something else. The country does show a better 
index level than Bulgaria both before accession and after. Bulgaria its progress does not show peak 
performances and shows after accession no substantial increase in income equality. This still goes in 
line with the theory of the intertwined relation between corruption and income inequality. Because the 
level of corruption remains almost the same, the income inequality does not improve throughout the 
years. As for Croatia, the country shows another development. It seemed that Croatia had a more 
effective way of implementing anti-corruption policies under EU criteria, which led to a positive 
development of the CPI. However, the Gini index is left behind. It even shows an increase, which does 
not support the theory of interdependence. Therefore, it has been proven that the theory does not suit 
all countries and that other reasons must be found to explain their performance. Romania shows a 
different, more positive path after accession than Bulgaria. This could suggest that the influence of 
accession continues after membership. For Bulgaria, however, the results show only slight differences 
and the tone of the EC does hardly change. The concern for Bulgaria its level of corruption remains 
with little progress on the established benchmarks. Therefore, little progress is shown in the Gini 
index. As for Croatia, the reports before accession already show slight positive results. This could be 
reason enough for the EU to remove the focus on anti-corruption. However, a lack of data makes it 
hard to include Croatia in the theory of the intertwined relation between corruption and income 
inequality.  
To conclude, the EU accession has influenced the anti-corruption policies to a large extent. This by 
strongly monitoring and evaluating the progress made by the countries. This resulted in the shown data 
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that shows that the relation between the level of corruption and the distribution of income is different 
for all three countries and therefore cannot be generalised for all three Member States.  
VIII. Discussion 
On the one hand, there can argued that anti-corruption policy may have been better implemented by 
the Romanian government, but on the other hand Romania was known for the most corrupted of the 
three and had to come from afar, which made the differences proportionally bigger.  
Furthermore, the above observed developments could also be due to other factors that have not been 
taken into account in this study, but could have been influential. For example, the financial crisis of 
2008. It has been said that Romania had much bigger problems with the crisis and had to respond 
differently to overcome the additional issues. The measures taken by the Romanian government can 
also have had positive outcome on the distribution of income in the country. Furthermore, other 
measures or policies could have been more influential than the anti-corruption policy. For example, all 
three countries were categorised as countries with severe economic disadvantages. To overcome these 
advantages, the EU advised and requested other reforms on other levels. These reforms could have 
been more influential on the Gini index then the anti-corruption policies did.  
Then, when analysing literature about corruption and the existence of corruption in the countries, the 
data to indicate the issue comes from organisations like the World Bank and the Corruption Perception 
Index of Transparency International. Although these indicators are frequently used, the issue remains 
that this data is only based on perception. The problem with perception is that it is supported on an 
external image of how citizens, the international community, business and political partners rank the 
performance of a country. This is not based on exact figures of the actual corruptive actions within the 
state (Budak, 2007). This is because - as mentioned before - due to the difficult character of corruption 
which are difficult to measure.  
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Appendix 1: Ten principles for fighting corruption (EU) 
Ten principles for improving the fight against corruption in acceding, candidate and other third 
countries (European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee - On a comprehensive EU policy 
against corruption, 2003): 
1. To ensure credibility, a clear stance against corruption is essential from leaders and decision-
makers. Bearing in mind that no universally applicable recipes exist, national anti-corruption 
strategies or programmes, covering both preventive and repressive measures, should be drawn 
up and implemented. These strategies should be subject to broad consultation at all levels. 
2. Current and future EU Members shall fully align with the EU acquis and ratify and implement 
all main international anti-corruption instruments they are party to (UN, Council of Europe 
and OECD Conventions). Third countries should sign and ratify as well as implement relevant 
international anti-corruption instruments. 
3. Anti-corruption laws are important, but more important is their implementation by competent 
and visible anti-corruption bodies (i.e. well trained and specialised services such as anti-
corruption prosecutors). Targeted investigative techniques, statistics and indicators should be 
developed. The role of law enforcement bodies should be strengthened concerning not only 
corruption but also fraud, tax offences and money laundering. 
4. Access to public office must be open to every citizen. Recruitment and promotion should be 
regulated by objective and merit-based criteria. Salaries and social rights must be adequate. 
Civil servants should be required to disclose their assets. Sensitive posts should be subject to 
rotation. 
5. Integrity, accountability and transparency in public administration (judiciary, police, customs, 
tax administration, health sector, public procurement) should be raised through employing 
quality management tools and auditing and monitoring standards, such as the Common 
Assessment Framework of EU Heads of Public Administrations and the Strasbourg 
Resolution. Increased transparency is important in view of developing confidence between the 
citizens and public administration. 
6. Codes of conduct in the public sector should be established and monitored. 
7. Clear rules should be established in both the public and private sector on whistle blowing 
(given that corruption is an offence without direct victims who could witness and report it) and 
reporting. 
8. Public intolerance of corruption should be increased, through awareness-raising campaigns in 
the media and training. The central message must be that corruption is not a tolerable 
phenomenon, but a criminal offence. Civil society has an important role to play in preventing 
and fighting the problem. 
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9. Clear and transparent rules on party financing, and external financial control of political 
parties, should be introduced to avoid covert links between politicians and (illicit) business 
interests. Political parties evidently have strong influence on decision-makers, but are often 
immune to anti-bribery laws. 
10. Incentives should be developed for the private sector to refrain from corrupt practices such as 
codes of conduct or "white lists" for integer companies. 
 
 
Appendix 2 Benchmarks for anti-corruption policy Romania and Bulgaria 
The benchmarks to be addressed by Romania, established by the Commission in 2006 (European 
Commission, Communication From the Commission: Monitoring report on the state of preparedness 
for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania, 2006, p. 10):  
1. Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process notably by enhancing the capacity and 
accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the 
new civil and penal procedures codes.  
2. Establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, 
incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions on the 
basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken.  
3. Building on progress already made, continue to conduct professional, non-partisan 
investigations into allegations of high-level corruption.  
4. Take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within the local 
government.  
The benchmarks to be addressed by Bulgaria, established by the Commission in 2006 (European 
Commission, Communication From the Commission: Monitoring report on the state of preparedness 
for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania, 2006, p. 10):  
1. Adopt constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the independence and 
accountability of the judicial system.  
2. Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and implementing a new 
judicial system act and the new civil procedure code. Report on the impact of these new laws 
and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial phase.  
3. Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, accountability and 
efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results annually.  
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4. Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level 
corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the publication of 
assets of high-level officials.  
5. Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders and within 
local government.  
6. Implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious crime, money laundering 
as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on new and ongoing 
investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas. 
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Appendix 3 CPI and Gini Index per country 
 
Bulgaria Romania Croatia 
Date CPI Gini CPI Gini CPI Gini 
1998 2,9  3    
1999 3,3  3,3  2,7  
2000 3,5 25,6 2,9 29,32 3,7 31,33 
2001 3,9  2,8  3,9  
2002 4  2,6  3,8  
2003 3,9  2,8  3,7  
2004 4,1  2,9  3,5  
2005 4  3  3,4  
2006 4 35,73 3,1 39,18 3,4 28 
2007 4,1 28,14 3,7 37,61 4,1 28 
2008 3,6 33,57 3,8 29,4 4,4 29 
2009 3,8 33,82 3,8 28,19 4,1 27 
2010 3,6 35,65 3,7 28,16 4,1 32 
2011 3,3 34,28 3,6 27,21 4 31 
2012 4,1 36,01 4,4 27,33 4,6 31 
2013 4,1 35,4 4,3 27,4 4,8 31 
2014 4,3  4,3  4,8 30 
2015 4,1  4,6  5,1  
 
Note: These results are more detailed, but the same  results as graph 1-4 on page 18-20. 
 (World Bank, 2016; Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2016) 
